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Abstract
On the basis of a 2019 YouGov survey of white respondents (n = 734), the impact of racial beliefs on support for
Donald Trump was explored. The analysis revealed that in addition to racial resentment, white nationalism—a desire
to keep the United States white demographically and culturally—was strongly related to faith in Trump. Analyses based
on a 2019 Amazon Mechanical Turk survey yielded similar results and also showed that white nationalism increased
willingness to wear a MAGA hat. Future research on the political consequences of racial beliefs should focus on what
whites think not only of blacks but also of themselves.
Keywords
white nationalism, Trump, MAGA, racial resentment, racial sympathy

The scene is familiar. Donald Trump stands at the podium
leading a political rally. In a theatrical performance, he holds
court for an hour or two. Hands waving and his rhetoric peppered with terms such as “many people say,” “huge,” “fake,”
and “vicious” (always toward him!), he excoriates his liberal
enemies and incites the crowd. They applaud wildly and, at
times, break out into chants such as “Lock her up” and “Send
them back.” After his defeat in the 2020 presidential election,
the slogans now include “Stop the steal” (AP Reporter 2020).
The backdrop behind him is instructive. No, there is no
set of American flags or a Trump-Pence banner arranged
from one side of the stage to the other. Rather, a slice of the
audience has been strategically selected to sit behind the
president—happily cheering at every opportunity. They
send a message. First, they are all white—with the possible
exception of the single onlooker holding up a “Blacks for
Trump” sign. This anomalous image only makes the whiteness of the occasion more poignant (Givhan 2019). The
president’s expressions of racial and ethnic animus are regularly featured and applauded (Fording and Schram 2020;
Kulig et al. forthcoming; O’Connor and Marans 2018).
Second, the members of the backdrop crowd are almost
all wearing bright red MAGA (Make America Great Again)
hats—as Trump, dressed in an expensive suit and tie, often
does himself (Herrman 2020). Hats are a sign of intense loyalty, whether it is a Yankees hat, a university hat, or a Trump
hat. They are a public expression of identity—a proud
announcement of allegiance (Crane 2012; see also Givhan

2019). For supporters, donning a MAGA hat expresses special affection for the president—a form of identity fusion
(see Kunst, Dovidio, and Thomsen 2019). For critics, the hat
has become a “provocation”: “a symbol of us vs. them, of
exclusion and suspicion, of garrulous narcissism, of white
male privilege, of violence and hate” (Givhan 2019; see also
Barlow 2019). Indeed, then president-elect Joe Biden felt the
need to respond to “a half-decade of domed messaging to
troll Trump with a hat of his own” (Wolf 2020). In a rejoinder
to “Make America Great Again,” Biden’s hat carried the
rebuttal slogan “We Just Did” (Wolf 2020). At least a million
customers have purchased an official MAGA hat (Brennan
2019), available for $30 on the Trump Web site (https://shop.
donaldjtrump.com/collections/headwear). At a reduced
price, thousands more unauthorized MAGA hats have been
sold on Amazon and on Chinese e-commerce portals (Chen
2020; Herrman 2020). Who are these people who put on the
MAGA hats? Who are these people who have intense faith in
Donald Trump and believe that he will “make American
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great again”? In this article, we seek to address this
question.
Trump communicates a unique message: he is strong; his
opponents are weak. He understands and has a special capacity to protect his flock against the threats they face. He alone
can make American great again, restoring the nation to a
place where good, patriotic citizens are valued and not called
a “basket of deplorables” (Reilly 2016). Those embracing
this message have a deep allegiance to the man, not necessarily a specific ideology (Barber and Pope 2019). Their faith in
Trump is consequential. The Republican Party platform
should be anything Trump says it is. More than this, such
faith inoculates Trump against any criticism: impeachments,
repeated lies, accusations of sexual misconduct, corruption
in his administration and pardoning criminal associates,
attacks on previously treasured institutions such as the
Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, the embrace of Vladimir Putin and other
authoritarian rulers, knowingly misleading the public about
wearing masks and the dangers of a pandemic whose death
toll exceeds 430,000, false claims about the 2020 election
being stolen, and best-selling exposés alleging that he is unfit
for the presidency (see, e.g., Cohen 2020; Rucker and
Leonnig 2020; Woodward 2020). Although a touch hyperbolic, Trump captured the loyalty of his audience at an Iowa
campaign rally when he stated, “I could stand in the middle
of Fifth Avenue and shoot somebody, and I wouldn’t lose any
voters, OK? It’s, like, incredible” (Dwyer 2016).
Various explanations have been offered for this expression of faith in Trump. Given the whiteness of his supporters—whether in crowds or in the voting booth—and his
frequent anti–minority group rhetoric, a common view is that
Trump draws his support from those harboring racial animus.
Like other Republicans before him, he is portrayed simply as
“playing the race card” (Maxwell and Shields 2019). An
alternative perspective is that the president’s unique appeal
rests on his affirmation of whites’ in-group racial identity and
legitimation of the desire to keep the nation culturally and
demographically white (see, e.g., Jardina 2019b; Kaufmann
2019). The reference is to widespread attitudes in society and
not to membership in a white supremacy group (Jardina
2019a, 2019b; Kaufmann 2019). Out-group racial animus
and in-group racial solidarity are thus seen as analytically, if
not substantively, distinct. As Kaufmann (2019) noted, “the
common view that white identity leads to dislike of minorities is misplaced” (p. 128).
In this context, in the present project, we explore the relationship between racial beliefs and support for President
Trump. Specifically, the focus is on the connection between
belief in white nationalism and faith in Trump, controlling
for a standard measure of racial resentment (Kinder and
Sanders 1996) and a new measure of racial sympathy
(Chudy 2017, 2021). Controls also are introduced for other
explanations that might account for Trump’s appeal: membership in his base electorate, political allegiance
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(Republican, conservative ideology), and fear (of crime and
of a chaotic world).

Racial Beliefs and Faith in Trump
Unpacking Racial Beliefs
Research surrounding racial beliefs has transitioned from
traditional, overt racism in which blacks are seen as biologically and socially inferior, to “symbolic” or “laissez-faire”
racism, in which blacks’ disadvantaged state is attributed to
individual failings, and their receipt of government assistance is judged as special treatment (Bobo, Kluegel, and
Smith 1997; Henry and Sears 2002). Kinder and Sanders
(1996) defined this construct as “racial resentment” and
developed a scale that is now the field’s standard measure.
Extensive research shows that racial resentment is a robust
predictor of a range of social policy preferences (Cramer
2020; Unnever, Cullen, and Jonson 2008). In fact, the failure
to include racial resentment in policy analyses would risk
omitted variable bias.
Recently, however, attempts have been made to unpack
racial beliefs into different components and to explore their
consequences. Two important advances merit attention.
First, “defined as white distress over black suffering,”
Chudy (2021:123) showed that “racial sympathy” differs
from racial resentment and is related significantly to public
policy preferences, such as government support for blacks,
increased federal spending on welfare programs, and government subsidies for black businesses. She contended that
positive racial attitudes can lead whites to endorse policies
beneficial to African Americans. At issue is whether those
with racial sympathy are less likely to look favorably upon
Donald Trump.
Second, in light of the trends in growing demographic
diversity creating a number of majority-minority states
(Jardina 2019b, Jones 2016), scholars are focusing on what
whites think not only about blacks but also about themselves,
with attention paid to the influence of constructs such as
white identity and consciousness (Jardina 2019b). Our interest is on what Kaufmann (2019) termed white “ethno-traditional nationalism,” also known as “white nationalism.” This
is the “desire to limit change to the ethnic composition of the
nation” (Kaufmann 2019:515), that is, to keep America a
majority white nation. The essential point is that although
modestly correlated, white nationalism is distinct conceptually and empirically from racial animus (Jardina 2019a,
Kaufmann 2019), a relationship we show ahead. When
nationalism and animus merge—and include views of black
inferiority and racial hierarchy—they foster white supremacy. Still, the independent effects of white nationalism and
racial resentment should be assessed. As noted later, both of
these factors matter in expressions of faith in Trump.
Five key characteristics define white nationalism and
the goal to keep the United States a white nation
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demographically and culturally. First, those holding white
nationalistic beliefs view being white as part of their social
identity, much in the same way being black or Hispanic is
part of an individual’s social identity (Jardina 2019a;
Kaufmann 2019). Second, they wish to maintain “the ethnic
majority as an important component of the nation alongside
other groups” (Kaufmann 2019:11; Swain 2001). This identity as part of the white ethnic majority and its symbols are
highly valued. Third, they favor slower immigration, as
opposed to outright rejection of immigration, to “permit
enough immigrants to voluntarily assimilate into the ethnic
majority,” which is critical to maintaining white ethno-traditionalism (Kaufmann 2019:11). Fourth, related to immigration, they are concerned about “the potential [immigration
has] to transform societies,” which places their ethnic majority at risk (Kaufmann 2019:515). Fifth, those holding white
nationalistic views do not inherently also hold views of racial
animus or prejudice (i.e., white supremacy) (Taub 2016).
They deeply resent this stigmatization (Hochschild 2016;
Kaufmann 2019; Scott 2019). Again, they wish to “secure
their multi-generational group attachments and identity reference points for posterity” (Kaufmann 2019:69).
Just to be clear, we decided to use the term white nationalism only after much deliberation. Our initial reluctance was
because this phrase is at times used interchangeably in public
and academic discourse with white supremacy. We have
been careful to distinguish between the two constructs. We
settled on white nationalism, however, because it captures
the essence of the belief being measured: a preference for a
nation that is culturally and demographically white (see
Kulig et al. 2020). (Note that this is similar to “white
Christian nationalism”; see Davis and Perry forthcoming;
Whitehead, Perry, and Baker 2018.) Terms such as in-group
solidarity–out-group hostility and ethno-traditional nationalism have merit and arguably could be used as alternatives
(see, e.g., Fording and Schram 2020; Kaufmann 2019). Still,
this language fails to convey descriptively the core theme
being investigated: how whites think about the racial status
of their nation at this historical juncture. White nationalism
succeeds in this regard.

Consequences of Racial Beliefs
According to Jardina (forthcoming), the dominant paradigm
in the study of electoral politics has been to “dismiss the
study of in-group attitudes and identities among white
Americans, focusing instead on whites’ out-group attitudes
in the form of racial prejudice or racial resentment” (p. 3).
Her work on white identity politics challenges this view as
overly narrow. Beyond racial animus, observed Jardina
(forthcoming), “some whites may also be swayed by their
desire to protect the interests of their in-group and to maintaining their group’s power and privileges” (p. 3). As a
result, “political candidates may be able to appeal to or activate two distinct, but arguably equally insidious, racial
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forces in contemporary electoral politics” (p. 3). Jardina
(forthcoming) called these “in-group love and out-group
hate” (p. 1). We argue that this revised perspective has
implications for understanding whites’ allegiance to
President Trump.
From the very start of his 2016 campaign, Donald Trump
made race and ethnicity a key policy initiative, starting by
accusing Mexican immigrants of “bringing drugs . . . bringing crime . . . [and being] rapists” (Enns 2018; Washington
Post Staff 2015). Furthermore, he proposed banning immigrants from Muslim-majority nations and constructing a
wall across the southern U.S. border to “stop the drugs . . .
shore up the border . . . [and] to get all of the drug lords”
(Garfield 2016). Aside from his policy positions, Trump has
used racially infused comments to describe cities such as
Chicago and Baltimore, to support Confederate monuments
and actors on all sides in Charlottesville, to attack athleteactivists such as Colin Kaepernick, and to attack activist
groups such as Black Lives Matter (BLM). Furthermore,
Trump has promoted his appeal to whiteness by appointing
alleged white nationalists Stephen Miller and Steve Bannon
to key positions within his White House staff (Davis and
Shear 2019). Ultimately, at issue is whether support for
Trump is primarily rooted in racial resentment or in his
appeal to white nationalism.
Although the size of the effect is in dispute (Enns 2018),
there is a wealth of research showing that racial animus
increased favorable ratings of and voting for Donald Trump.
The extant studies also reveal, however, that another factor
played a role in his primary and presidential elections: antiimmigrant sentiments (see, e.g., Fording and Schram 2020;
Griffin and Teixeira 2017; Hooghe and Dassonneville 2018;
Kaufmann 2019; McElwee and McDaniel 2017; Newman,
Shah, and Collingwood 2018; Sides, Tesler, and Vavreck
2017). Trump’s political genius was in making immigration
a salient issue (Kaufmann 2019). He used it not only to derogate out-group members but also to signal “to whites with
higher levels of racial solidarity that he had their group’s
interests in mind” (Jardina forthcoming:8). As Jardina (forthcoming) observed,
Immigration arguably poses an exceptional threat to whites’
dominance because it introduces foreigners with unfamiliar
cultures and languages that may be perceived as threatening the
nation’s dominant Anglo-Saxon traditions, and it has contributed
to the loss of white Americans’ numerical majority. . . . Several
scholars and pundits have argued that immigration poses a risk
to white American culture. (p. 8, note 8)

Importantly, Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming) empirical analyses show that not only racial resentment but also white identity (the importance of being white to one’s identity) and
white consciousness (whites cannot find a job because of
minority hiring, whites must work together to change laws
unfair to them) have political consequences. Using the
(January) 2016 ANES Pilot Study, Jardina (2019b) examined
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how racial beliefs influenced “affective evaluations of Trump
using the 101-point feeling thermometer measures, where
respondents are asked to rate how warm or cold they feel
toward a particular political figure” (p. 235). Beyond the
effects of racial resentment, white identity and consciousness
had a substantively large effect in increasing warmth toward
Trump. Equally instructive, compared with other 2016 primary and general election candidates, Trump was “unique in
his appeal to racially conscious whites” (Jardina 2019b:239;
see also Jardina forthcoming). The data also demonstrated
that white consciousness contributed to a preference for
Trump in the 2016 presidential vote choice (Jardina 2019b).
“We cannot understand the rise and success of Donald
Trump,” Jardina (2019b) concluded, “without turning our
attention to white racial identity and consciousness” (p. 265).1
In this regard, Trump appears to have been remarkably
effective in using racial messages to evoke white allegiance.
Hochschild’s (2016) ethnographic study of Tea Party supporters in Louisiana is revealing. She began by documenting
how whites in bayou country feel “culturally marginalized,”
a “besieged minority” in which “strangers [people of color]
step ahead of you in line, making you anxious, resentful, and
afraid” (pp. 221–22). Attending the then-candidate’s campaign rally, Hochschild noted that “nearly everyone is white;
apart from protesters, the only blacks I see are security
guards or vendors hawking Trump T-shirts” (p. 222).
Hochschild then described Trump’s special talent in appealing to his followers’ “emotional self-interest,” of providing
“a giddy release from the feeling of being a stranger in one’s
own land” (p. 228; see also Kimmel 2013; Schrock et al.
2017). Trump derogated out-groups such as radical Muslims,
“bad hombres” from Mexico, and blacks and women receiving unfair advantages. He promised to make America great
again for the real majority of Americans: whites. “The costumes, hats, signs, and symbols,” observed Hochschild,
“reaffirm this new sense unity” (p. 226). Hochschild used
Emile Durkheim’s concept of “collective effervescence” to
capture the excitement Trump evoked and his ability to
“unify worshipers” (pp. 225–26). Faith in Trump ran high.

1

In Hard White, Fording and Schram (2020) argued that white
identity’s effects on support for Trump are indirect through outgroup hostility, including anti-immigrant animus. In our Amazon
Mechanical Turk data (discussed ahead), we were able assess this
contention by incorporating into our analysis a five-item scale measuring whether immigrants crossing the U.S.-Mexican border are
seen as hard-working and filling unwanted U.S. jobs or as likely to
commit serious crimes and take jobs from Americans (α = .829,
factor loadings between .716 and .848). This variable was unrelated
to willingness to wear a MAGA hat but was significantly related to
faith in Trump (β = .147). Still, even with anti-immigrant hostility in the model, white nationalism retained a robust direct effect
on faith in Trump (β = .292). Our YouGov data did not contain a
measure of anti-immigrant hostility, so this analysis could not be
undertaken with those data.
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As one “middle-aged man” commented, “To be in the presence of such a man!” (p. 224 emphasis in original).

Research Strategy
In this context, in the current project, we examine whether
three racial beliefs are associated with faith in Donald Trump:
racial resentment and two new constructs, racial sympathy
and white nationalism. The term faith is used because the
outcome is not voting preferences but the belief that the president is a strong leader with special talents to protect the
nation and to “make America great again.” Presented in the
“Methods” section, a first and an important task is to show
that the three racial beliefs are empirically distinct. This turns
out to be the case, making further analysis possible. These
results also constitute a unique methodological advance in
the measurement of racial beliefs.
To assess the independent effects of racial beliefs, we propose four potential models that might predict faith in Trump.
First, in the Trump base model, the president’s support comes
from his political base, which includes men, Republicans,
those living in the South, and evangelicals. Second, in the
political model, support is derived from political values
aligned with conservatives and antisocialist viewpoints.
Third, in the crime salience model, support is tied to Trump’s
ability to quell fears of crime and the perceptions of the dangerousness of the world with his masculinity, bravado, and
support for greater security (e.g., border wall). Fourth, in the
racial model—the main focus of the study—support for
Trump stems from his policy positions and pronouncements
on race in American society. This perspective would propose
that those who harbor racial animus and lack sympathy for
black distress would endorse the president. Given the president’s linking of whiteness to what makes American great
and his appeal to whites’ emotional interests (Hochschild
2016), this model would also see white nationalism as a
robust predictor of faith in Trump.
Before proceeding, some attention needs to paid to an
alternative approach that focuses on “white Christian nationalism,” including its impact on voting for Donald Trump (see
Whitehead et al. 2018; see also Jones 2016). Research in this
vein surveys whites about their desire for the United States to
be a Christian nation (e.g., “The federal government should
advocate Christian values”). Originally, the view of America
as a “WASP” (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) country was
hegemonic, but eventually Christian nationalism became
associated with conservative social and political views and
concentrated in southern states (Jones 2016). Following
Jardina (2019b) and Kaufmann (2019), we focus on whites’
preference for an in-group nation (white nationalism) separately from religion (which we include as a control), assessing their effects independently. Note that support for Trump
is not confined to southern or red states. In fact, because of
population density, more Trump voters (38 million of 74 million) live in states won by Biden (Bump 2020). That said, we
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view research on white nationalism and on white Christian
nationalism as complementary and as meriting attention in
future studies.

Methods
Samples
We use two national-level surveys designed by the research
team: one is used for the main analysis conducted by YouGov,
and one serves as a supplementary analysis to assess the
robustness of effects through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk
(MTurk). The first survey was placed in the field June 7 to
10, 2019, by YouGov, an intetrnational survey company with
a pool of more than 2 million U.S. residents who participate
in large, opt-in panels. YouGov’s methodology includes a
three-phase sampling strategy, which is designed to produce
an estimated nationally representative sample of the target
population (Rivers 2006). In the first phase, a synthetic sampling frame is constructed using high-quality probability surveys and large-scale, commercially available databases—in
our case, the 2016 American Community Survey (ACS).
Second, YouGov panel members are matched to this synthetic sampling frame on the basis of several demographic
and behavioral characteristics; in our case, 1,427 panel members were matched on the basis of gender, age, race, and education. Third, propensity score weighting is used to adjust
any biases within the sample (Rivers 2006; see Thielo 2017
for a detailed review). This methodology has been found to
produce estimates of relational inferences that are in the
same direction and of similar magnitude to large-scale probability-based samples (i.e., the General Social Survey)
(Graham, Pickett, and Cullen forthcoming).
In our sample, this process led to the approximated representative sample of 1,200 respondents. Given the focus of
this study, only white respondents were included in this
study, which reduced the sample to 770 respondents. Finally,
because of missing values (<5 percent), the final analytic
sample was 734 white respondents.2 Compared with ACS
estimates of white Americans (in parentheses), this sample
was 51.3 percent female (50.7 percent), 51.7 percent were
married (52.2 percent), 44.6 percent had a college degree or
higher (35.7 percent), 87.8 percent were registered voters
(63.7 percent), and 38.2 percent resided in the South (35.6
percent). Furthermore, compared with Pew Research Center

2

The YouGov measure of family income included in the core profile items typically has a large number of missing values (n = 77
in our data) because it includes the response option of “prefer not
to say.” As a result, to retain the sample size, we omitted family
income from our main analysis in Table 1. Still, in a supplementary analysis, we created an economic model that included both full
employment and income. Neither variable had a significant effect.
Thus, adding income to the analysis did not substantively alter the
findings.
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estimates (in parentheses), 33.9 percent of this sample identified as Republican (54 percent), and 29.8 percent identified
as evangelical Christians (25.4 percent). Finally, 38.8 percent of our sample identified as politically conservative,
compared with a Gallup estimate of 39 percent of white
Americans.
The second survey, obtained via MTurk, was fielded in
October 2019. Again, these data offered an opportunity to
see if the YouGov findings with regard to racial beliefs had
the same effects across an independent sample. This platform
allows “workers” to select from and complete different tasks
for a small financial incentive—$3.38 for completing our
survey. The use of these opt-in surveys provides the benefits
of reducing satisficing, interviewer effects, and measurement
error (Chang and Krosnick 2009). To recruit high-quality
respondents, only “workers” who had 90 percent or greater
approval ratings were allowed the opportunity to complete
this survey (Peer, Vosgerau, and Acquisti 2014).
Of the original 763 respondents, the sample was reduced
to 465 responses by removing those who failed any one of
two attention check items (e.g., mark “not likely at all”),
were missing on variables used in the analytic models (<5
percent), and were nonwhite, given our interest in racial
resentment and perceptions of white nationalism. Of this
sample, 37.8 percent were women, 43.4 percent were married, 65.8 percent had a college degree or higher, 36.3 percent resided in the South, 26.0 percent identified as
Republican, 12.0 percent identified as religious fundamentalist, and 30.1 percent identified as politically conservative.
Note that an emerging literature documents that results
from matched opt-in samples (such as our YouGov sample)
produce results more consistent (i.e., direction and magnitude of coefficients) with national probability samples (e.g.,
the General Social Survey) than do nonmatched opt-in samples (such as our MTurk sample) (see Graham et al. forthcoming; Thompson and Pickett 2019). Nonetheless, it is
possible that our use of multi-item scales with strong measurement properties (i.e., α, factor loadings) yield comparable findings between the YouGov and MTurk data, resulting
in similar factor loadings and coefficients for racial variables
reported below. Furthermore, on the basis of the ACS white
population estimates (described earlier), we also estimated
these models using poststratification weights with the MTurk
data, again producing similar results. We report the
unweighted results because the use of models’ predictors to
develop weights will unnecessarily increase the standard
errors, thus decreasing the precision of the estimates produced (Solon, Haider, and Wooldridge 2015; Winship and
Radbill 1994).

Dependent Variables
Our key dependent variable, faith in Trump, seeks not to
capture who voted for Trump but those who embrace the
president because they see him as a special leader. They
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admire his style and strength, his promise to care for them
and protect them from threats, and his unique ability to
return the United States to a nation they once cherished. Our
goal was to select distinctive statements that reflected how
Trump framed his candidacy to the electorate. Thus, using a
Likert-type scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly
agree), respondents in both samples rated their agreement or
disagreement with five items: (1) “I believe that President
Trump will make America great again,” (2) “President
Trump is 100% correct that we need a wall to make sure that
gang members, criminals, and rapists do not come into the
U.S.,” (3) “President Trump is the only politician who really
cares about the common man,” (4) “President Trump knows
how to protect America against threats from around the
world,” and (5) “I love President Trump’s style because he
tells it like it is” (see Table 2). These items appear to differentiate those with and without faith in Trump with high reliability (α = .974) and high factor loadings (between .920
and .974).
Unique to our MTurk sample, we asked respondents,
“How willing or unwilling are you to wear a ‘Make
America Great Again’ (MAGA) hat in public?” Response
options ranged from 1 = very unwilling to 7 = very willing. This outcome is important because it represents a
behavioral intention measure of faith in Trump. As noted,
donning a bright red, easily distinguishable MAGA hat is a
public expression of affinity for Donald Trump, one he
encourages (Givhan 2020; see also Crane 2012). Wearing
a MAGA hat is a “declaration of identity” to in-group
members (Givhan 2019); it also risks exposing a Trump
supporter to social exclusion, verbal insult, and even physical assaults from out-group members (see, e.g., Smith
2020; Torres 2019). If the findings hold with this dependent variable, it provides added confidence that the factor
in question has effects that are robust across different ways
of assessing faith in Trump.

Independent Variables
White nationalism is the key construct in the study. Again,
this is not a measure of white supremacy or of belonging to a
formal white racial organization. Consistent with Kaufmann’s
(2019) use of the concept of ethno-traditional nationalism,
white nationalism is used to capture the belief that the United
States should remain culturally and demographically a white
nation. Building on prior writings, but particularly on
Kaufmann (2019), we developed a four-item scale to measure the concept, with responses (see Table 2) ranging from
1 = strongly agree to 5 = strongly disagree: (1) “The immigrants now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—want to turn America into a third-world country where
white people are a tiny minority”; (2) “Although people
won’t admit it, white people and their culture are what made
America great in the first place”; (3) “Although everyone is
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welcome in the country, America must remain mostly a white
nation to remain #1 in the world”; and (4) “We need to reduce
immigration to keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—which
is what God meant it to be” (α = .872, factor loadings
between .813 and .883; see Table 1). All responses were
recoded so that higher values indicated a greater preference
for white nationalism.
Aside from white nationalism, an averaged four-item
scale of racial resentment drawn from Kinder and Sanders
(1996) asked respondents in both samples to rate their level
of agreement using a five-point Likert-type scale to statements such as “It’s really a matter of some people not trying
hard enough; if blacks would only try harder, they could be
just as well off as whites” (α = .888, factor loadings between
.856 and .885). Responses were coded such that higher values indicate greater racial resentment toward blacks.
Relatedly and confined to the MTurk sample, these items
were adapted to develop a Hispanic resentment scale to
reflect animus toward Hispanics, a group that Trump has
denigrated publicly, using statements such as “Generations
of discrimination have created conditions that make it difficult for Hispanics to work their way out of the lower class”
(α = .887, factor loadings between .887 and .916).
Conversely, a four-item scale of racial sympathy developed by Chudy (2017) was used to capture white distress
over black suffering in the YouGov sample. Respondents
rated their level of sympathy for individuals in four vignettes
on a five-point Likert-type scale, with higher values indicating more racial sympathy for the individuals in the vignettes
(α = .791, factor loadings between .676 and .872). This scale
was adapted to reflect white distress over Hispanics’ suffering in the MTurk sample using the same vignettes, but the
word Hispanic was used in place of black (α = .831; factor
loadings between .737 and .875).
A key consideration is whether the three racial beliefs are
empirically distinct. In previous research, Chudy (2017,
2021) demonstrated that racial sympathy and racial resentment were not simply the opposite ends of the same attitudinal spectrum. Although correlated (r = –.45), they loaded
on separate factors in factor analysis. Her analysis is presented in Table 3, and comparable results are found for both
the YouGov and MTurk surveys. Our study introduces the
measure for white nationalism, which is positively related to
racial resentment (r = .576) and negatively related to racial
sympathy (r = –.465) (see Table 1). The correlation between
racial resentment and sympathy is –.510. Importantly, in
both the YouGov and MTurk data, our exploratory factor
analysis revealed that white nationalism, racial resentment,
and racial sympathy load onto three separate factors (see
Table 3). Taken together, these findings suggest that racial
resentment, racial sympathy, and white nationalism are
independent constructs whose potential separate effects
merit examination both in the present analysis and in future
studies. Note that, in and of itself, this finding represents an
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Note: MTurk = Amazon Mechanical Turk.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Faith in Trump
White nationalism
Racial resentment
Hispanic resentment
Racial sympathy
Hispanic sympathy
Fear of crime
Dangerous world
Antisocialism
Conservative (%)
Republican (%)
Evangelical Christian (%)
Religious fundamentalist (%)
Age
Sex (% female)
Full-time employment (%)
Married (%)
Education (% college degree or higher)
Registered voter (%)
Reside in South (%)

2.80
2.27
3.15
—
3.59
—
2.93
3.26
2.67
38.8
33.9
29.8
—
51.20
51.3
40.8
51.7
44.6
87.8
38.2

Mean
or %
1.58
1.11
1.16
—
1.00
—
1.00
.51
.96
—
—
—
—
17.75
—
—
—
—
—
—

SD

Table 1. YouGov Sample Descriptive Statistics (n = 734).

1–5
1–5
1–5
—
1–5
—
1–5
1–5
1–5
—
—
—
—
19–93
—
—
—
—
—
—

Range
.920–.974
.813–.883
.856–.885
—
.676–.872
—
.787–.900
.741–.840
.661–.829
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Factor
Loadings
.974
.872
.888
—
.791
—
.903
.796
.867
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
—

Cronbach’s
α

YouGov

—
.752***
.685***
—
−.457***
—
.183***
.285***
.681***
.645***
.583***
.370***
—
.208***
−.087*
−.086*
.160***
−.138***
−.056
.159***

Faith in
Trump
.752***
—
.576***
—
−.465***
—
.302***
.459***
.596***
.446***
.407***
.255***
—
.123**
−.096**
−.066
.133***
−.163***
−.109**
.080*

White
Nationalism

Correlations

2.27
2.38
2.59
2.58
—
3.74
—
—
—
30.1
26.0
—
12.0
38.04
37.8
76.8
43.4
65.8
—
36.3

Mean
or %
1.42
1.22
1.19
1.15
—
.95
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
11.22
—
—
—
—
—
—

SD

1–5
1–5
1–5
1–5
—
1–5
—
—
—
—
—
—
—
20–73
—
—
—
—
—
—

Range

—
.740***
.647***
.436***
—
−.397***
—
—
—
.726***
.629***
—
.445***
.047
−.077
.073
.166***
.138**
—
.122**

.814***
.633***
.482***
.264***
—
−.269***
—
—
—
.655***
.535***
—
.462***
.019
−.091
.172***
.212***
.220***
—
.098*

MAGA Hat
Wearing

Correlations
Faith in
Trump

MTurk
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Table 2. Faith in Trump, Beliefs in White Nationalism, and MAGA Hat Wearing Responses (%).

Faith in Trump (YouGov n = 734)
I believe that President Trump will make America great again.
President Trump is 100% correct that we need a wall to make sure that gang
members, criminals, and rapists do not come into the U.S.
President Trump is the only politician who really cares about the common man
President Trump knows how to protect America against threats from around
the world.
I love President Trump’s style because he is strong and tells it like it is.
White nationalism (YouGov n = 734)
The immigrants now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—want
to turn America into a third-world country where white people are a tiny
minority.
Although people won’t admit it, white people and their culture are what made
America great in the first place.
Although everyone is welcome in the country, America must remain mostly a
white nation to remain #1 in the world.
We need to reduce immigration to keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—
which is what God meant it to be.
MAGA hat wearing (MTurk n = 465)
How willing or unwilling are you to wear a “Make America Great Again”
(MAGA) hat in public?

TA

TD

SA

A

NAD

D

SD

43.0
48.6

43.8
41.4

25.0
35.4

18.0
13.2

13.2
10.0

2.9
3.9

40.9
37.4

29.6
45.3

54.0
43.1

15.8
21.9

13.8
23.4

16.4
11.6

10.0
4.8

44.1
38.3

42.4

46.0

25.1

17.3

11.5

5.1

41.0

35.9

44.4

18.8

17.1

19.7

8.6

35.8

24.6

50.1

8.5

16.1

25.3

16.7

33.4

11.3

69.7

3.7

7.6

18.9

19.4

50.3

9.6

70.9

4.7

4.9

19.5

16.8

54.1

VU
58.7

U
7.1

SU
5.4

NS
5.4

SW
7.1

W
6.9

VW
9.5

Note: Percentages may not total to 100 percent, because of rounding. A = somewhat agree; D = somewhat disagree; NAD = neither agree nor disagree;
NS = not sure; SA = strongly agree; SD = strongly disagree; SU = somewhat unwilling; SW = somewhat willing; TA = total of strongly agree and
somewhat agree; TD = total of strongly disagree and somewhat disagree; U = unwilling; VU = very unwilling; VW = very willing; W = willing.

Table 3. Comparison of Racial Sympathy and Racial Resentment.
Statistical Properties
Factor Loadings
Vignette 1: Laurette—hiring
Vignette 2: hair salon applicants
Vignette 3: bus depot
Vignette 4: Michael—police
Racial resentment—Irish
Racial resentment—generations
Racial resentment—try harder
Racial resentment—deserve
White nationalism—immigrants invading
White nationalism—white culture
White nationalism—#1 in the world
White nationalism—keep U.S. white nation
Explained variance
n

Chudy Study

YouGov Study

MTurk Study

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

Factor 1

Factor 2

Factor 3

.10
.05
−.06
−.23
.93
.88
.79
.84
—
—
—
—
43%

.88
.86
.63
.58
.11
.01
−.07
−.02
—
—
—
—
35%

.116
.105
−.140
−.354
.795
.944
.689
.905
.440
.228
−.132
−.148
48.12%

.822
.851
.722
.588
.088
−.043
.075
−.112
.043
−.037
−.025
−.016
11.99%
734

−.194
−.179
.228
.063
.223
−.173
.351
−.196
.567
.701
.946
.966
13.73%

.118
.068
−.251
−.164
.673
.862
.552
.869
.069
.170
−.127
−.178
9.79%

.823
.822
.693
.743
.092
−.096
.148
−.134
−.101
−.015
−.023
−.020
14.44%
465

−.201
−.187
.189
.064
.373
−.112
.535
−.161
.800
.795
.958
.969
60.91%

751

Note: Exploratory factor analyses using promax rotation. Bold variables indicated item loaded on factor. MTurk = Amazon Mechanical Turk.

important measurement advance in the study of racial
beliefs.
Additionally, views about egalitarianism were identified
through six items in the YouGov sample that were averaged to
reflect antisocialist views (e.g., “We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country”). For a full listing of items, see
the online Appendix. Respondents indicated their agreement

or disagreement with these statements on a five-point Likerttype scale (α = .867, factor loadings between .661 and .829).
Respondents’ fear of crime was measured in the YouGov
sample through the average response to five items about fear
of either “you or a member of your household” experiencing
one of these crimes: someone stealing money or property,
home break-in, street robbery or mugging, rape or sexual
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assault, and murder. Respondents identified how afraid or
unafraid of these crimes they were on a five-point Likert-type
scale (α = .903, factor loadings between .787 and .900).
Additionally, YouGov respondents reported their beliefs
about the dangerousness of the world more broadly through
four items (e.g., “Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt
all around us. All signs are pointing to it”; Altemeyer 1988).
See the online Appendix for exact items. Respondents’ beliefs
in a dangerous world were captured through agreement or
disagreement with these statements on a five-point Likerttype scale (α = .796, factor loadings between .741 and .840).
Given the political divisions within the U.S. geographic
regions, a dummy variable reflecting those living in the South
was created for both samples on the basis of respondents’
identified state of residence and the U.S. census regions.
Relatedly, consistent with previous research (see, e.g., King
and Wheelock 2007; Shelley et al. 2021), political ideology in
both samples was dummy-coded to reflect those who were
reportedly conservative or very conservative in order to avoid
excluding those who were “not sure” about their ideology
(“not sure” n = 42). Additionally, political party affiliation in
both samples was dummy-coded to reflect those identifying
as Republican. Given their central beliefs about the “born
again” experience (conversion), evangelical Christians were
identified in the YouGov sample by their affirmative response
to “Would you describe yourself as a born-again or evangelical Christian, or not?” (Pew Research Center 2018). In the
MTurk sample, religious fundamentalists were identified
through respondents’ describing their religious identity
(“somewhat well” or “very well”) as “fundamentalist,” “born
again,” or “evangelical” and/or endorsement that “the Bible
means exactly what it says. It should be taken literally, wordfor-word,” which is consistent with previous research (Baylor
Religion Survey 2007; Maxwell and Shields 2019).
Furthermore, all analyses for both samples controlled for
sociodemographic variables including age (continuously
measured), sex (1 = female, 0 = male), marital status (1 =
married, 0 = others), and education (1 = college degree or
higher, 0 = less than a college degree). Education was coded
in this way because support for Trump is markedly higher
among non-college-educated whites (Sides 2017; Sides et al.
2017). In addition, the YouGov models controlled for being
a registered voter in 2016 (1 = yes, 0 = no).3

Analytic Strategy
The present analysis was carried out in four steps. First, we
assess public attitudes toward Trump and white
3

At the request of a reviewer, YouGov models were estimated with
the registered voter variable removed from the analysis. Results for
the impact of white nationalism on faith in Trump were substantively the same. Therefore, this variable was retained to produce a
more fully specified model.
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nationalism in the YouGov sample descriptively. Second, we
explore a series of regression models using the YouGov sample to examine predictors of faith in Trump, with a special
focus on the effects of racial beliefs. Third, using data from
the MTurk sample, we explore a series of regression models
using the MTurk data to assess predictors of faith in Trump,
largely reproducing the findings from the YouGov data.
Finally, we examine the MTurk sample’s attitude toward
Trump using a proxy for faith in Trump: willingness to wear
a MAGA hat. All regression models were estimated using
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. All variance inflation factors were less than the cutoff of 4.0, which indicates
no concern with multicollinearity (Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch
1980; Fox 1991). Ultimately, controlling for a range of variables, the goal is to address the following question: Are racial
beliefs, including white nationalism, related to faith in Trump?

Results
Faith in Trump and Support for White
Nationalism: YouGov Sample
Table 2 reports the extent to which sample members agreed
or disagreed with the items measuring faith in Trump and
white nationalism. In describing the results, we present the
total agree percentage, which includes those answering
“agree” and “strongly agree.” As seen in Table 2, a substantial minority of respondents agreed with the five items used
to measure faith in Trump. Nearly half (48.6 percent) of
respondents agreed that “President Trump is 100% correct
that we need a wall to make sure that gang members, criminals, and rapists do not come into the U.S.” More than 4 in
10 agreed that “President Trump knows how to protect
America against threats from around the world” (45.3 percent), “I believe that President Trump will make America
great again” (43.0 percent), and “I love President Trump’s
style because he tells it like it is” (42.4 percent). Furthermore,
more than a quarter (29.6 percent) agreed that “President
Trump is the only politician who really cares about the common man.”
In addition, the respondents expressed a measure of support for the four items used to measure white nationalism.
More than a third (35.9 percent) agreed that “The immigrants
now invading our country—and their liberal supporters—
want to turn America into a third-world country where white
people are a tiny minority.” Nearly one in four (24.6 percent)
endorsed the view that “Although people won’t admit it,
white people and their culture are what made America great
in the first place.” In addition, roughly 1 in 10 agreed that
“Although everyone is welcome in the country, America
must remain mostly a white nation to remain #1 in the world”
(11.3 percent) and that “We need to reduce immigration to
keep the U.S. a mostly white nation—which is what God
meant it to be” (9.6 percent).
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Table 4. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Faith in Trump in the YouGov Sample (n = 734).
Trump Base Model

Crime Salience Model

Racial Model

b

SE

β

b

SE

β

b

SE

β

b

SE

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

—
—
—

−.002
.225
.572

.037
.042
.038

−.001
.165***
.402***

—
—

—
—

—
—

—
—

—
—

—
—

.238
.125

.047
.040

.131***
.062
.079** −.008

.042
.035

.034
−.005

—
—

—
—

—
—

.852
.648

.263***
.392***

.821
.593

.101
.046

.253***
.359***

.599
.180

.087
.052

.014
−.030
−.008
.032
−.066**
−.105***
.216***
.055*
.084**
—

.002
−.163
−.016
.095
−.117
−.455
.681
.157
.235
−.084

.019
−.057*
−.005
.030
−.037
−.094***
.204***
.048*
.068**
—

−.001
−.038
−.015
.052
.008
−.224
.536
.174
.211
−.183

Variable
Racial beliefs
Racial sympathy
Racial resentment
White nationalism
Crime salience
Dangerous world
Fear of crime
Political
Conservative
Antisocialist
Trump base and controls
Age
Female
Full-time employment
Married
Education
Registered voter
Republican
Reside in South
Evangelical Christian
Constant
Adjusted R2

Political Model

.011
−.282
−.010
.129
−.203
−.650
1.676
.206
.645
2.428

.003
.091
.102
.094
.096
.142
.102
.095
.106
.239
.422

.123***
−.089**
−.003
.041
−.064*
−.135***
.502***
.063*
.187***
—

.001
−.096
−.025
.102
−.211
−.506
.719
.179
.292
.920

.104
.047
.002
.074
.083
.076
.078
.116
.099
.076
.087
.222
.623

.002
.074
.080
.073
.076
.112
.096
.074
.084
.253
.650

.002
.063
.068
.063
.065
.096
.082
.063
.072
.284
.749

β

.185***
.109***
−.001
−.012
−.005
.017
.002
−.046*
.161***
.053**
.061**
—

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

Table 5. Ordinary Least Squares Regression Predicting Faith in Trump and MAGA Hat Wearing in the Amazon Mechanical Turk
Sample (n = 465).
Faith in Trump
Model 1
Variable
Racial beliefs
Hispanic sympathy
Hispanic resentment
Racial resentment
White nationalism
Control variables
Age
Sex
Full-time employment
Married
Education
Republican
Reside in South
Religious fundamentalist
Conservative
Constant
Adjusted R2

b
.028
.125
—
.501
.002
−.103
−.071
.116
.009
.478
.079
.342
1.025
.100

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.

SE
.048
.039
—
.039

MAGA Hat Wearing
Model 2

β
.019
.101**
—
.431***

b

SE

Model 3
β

b

—
—
.214
.419

—
—
.039
.040

—
.106
—
−.025
.180*** —
.360*** .665

.003
.017
.002
.075 −.035
−.094
.086 −.021
−.070
.074
.041
.079
.077
.003
.017
.114
.148***
.448
.073
.027
.078
.128
.079**
.391
.113
.332***
.963
.295
—
.186
.729

.003
.073
.084
.072
.075
.111
.071
.123
.112
.168
.740

.019
.005
−.032
−.278
−.021
.351
.028
.275
.006
.293
.139*** .403
.026
.087
.090**
.795
.312*** 1.615
—
−.769

Model 4

SE

β

b

SE

.091
.073
—
.074

.047
−.013
—
.375***

—
—
.069
.576

—
—
.076
.078

.006
.026
.004
.142 −.062
−.255
.163
.069*
.347
.141
.063
.299
.147
.064*
.313
.217
.082
.322
.138
.019
.091
.243
.120*
.919
.214
.343*** 1.579
.559
—
−.383
.581

β
—
—
.038
.324***

.006
.023
.142 −.057
.163
.068*
.140
.069*
.146
.069*
.215
.065
.138
.020
.238
.138***
.216
.335***
.325
—
.581
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Predictors of Faith in Trump: YouGov Sample

11

Table 4 presents a series of OLS linear regression models,
each with the theoretical potential to explain faith in Trump.
As expected in the Trump base model, being a Republican,
being an evangelical Christian, and residing in the South
were each significant, with Republican affiliation being the
strongest predictor (β = .502). The political model introduced conservative political ideology and antisocialist views,
showing both to be significant predictors of faith in Trump.
The crime salience model introduces belief in a dangerous
world and fear of crime, showing these to also be significant
predictors. Finally, the racial model presents the fully specified model; key variables from each previous model, with
the exception of the crime salience model, retain significance
in the analysis. Thus, all key variables in the Trump base
model were positively and significantly related to faith in
Trump (Republican, reside in South, evangelical Christian),
as were the variables in the political model (conservative,
antisocialist). Most important, racial beliefs appear consequential. Although racial sympathy was nonsignificant,
racial resentment and white nationalism were the strongest
predictors within the analysis, with white nationalism exerting the largest effect (β = .402). This model explained 74.9
percent of the variation in faith in Trump.

in model 4 (using traditional racial resentment). However,
neither racial resentment (Hispanic and black) nor Hispanic
sympathy was statistically significant in either model.
Finally, sensitivity analyses were conducted to assess possible effects. First, as noted in endnote 1, OLS models were
estimated that included income and full-time employment.
These factors were not significant and did not alter the
results. Second, an interaction effect of racial resentment ×
white nationalism was assessed. The interaction term was
not significant. Third, nonsignificant results also were found
for the interaction term of sex × white nationalism. Fourth,
two of the items in the faith in Trump scale refer to President
Trump’s building a wall to keep criminals from entering the
United States and protecting Americans from threats from
around the world, whereas the white nationalism scale refers
to the need to reduce immigration in two items. It could be
argued that the relationship between these two scales is due
to this overlap. We disagree because one scale asks about
faith in President Trump to prevent external threats, whereas
the other scale asks about the impact of immigration on the
racial composition of the United States. Still, we reestimated
the multivariate analyses deleting the two items from the
faith in Trump scale that referenced these external threats. As
anticipated, white nationalism remained a robust predictor of
faith in Trump in both the YouGov (model 4, β = .411) and
MTurk data (model 1, β = .414; model 2, β = .342).

Predictors of Faith in Trump: Supplementary
MTurk Sample

Discussion

As seen in Table 5, these multivariate findings regarding
faith in Trump were largely reproduced using the MTurk
sample across two models, one with measures of Hispanic
resentment and sympathy and one with the traditional measure of racial resentment (toward blacks). In both analyses
(models 1 and 2), white nationalism was the strongest predictor of faith in Trump (β = .431 and .360, respectively)
followed by conservative political ideology (β = .332 and
.312, respectively). In addition, Republican party affiliation
and religious fundamentalism were significant predictors
of faith in Trump. Notably, not only black resentment but
also Hispanic resentment was associated with great support
for Donald Trump. Neither black nor Hispanic sympathy
was significantly related to the outcome variable.
To further test this effect, we used the MTurk sample to
explicitly assess the willingness to wear a MAGA hat, a
proxy for faith in Trump. As seen in Table 2, nearly three in
four (71.2 percent) were either somewhat unwilling, unwilling, or very unwilling to wear this hat. However, a substantive proportion (23.5 percent) expressed a willingness to
wear this symbol of Trump.
As seen in Table 5, consistent with the previous analyses,
white nationalism was the most robust predictor (β = .375
and .324, respectively) of willingness to wear a MAGA hat
in model 3 (using Hispanic resentment and sympathy) and a
close second (β = .324) to conservative ideology (β = .335)

As Jardina (forthcoming) emphasized, public support for
Donald Trump is rooted in his appealing not only to outgroup animus but also to in-group solidarity, a conclusion
reinforced by the present study. As numerous news accounts
document, President Trump’s 2020 electoral strategy
involved openly stoking racial resentment and defending
white nationalism (see, e.g., Costa and Rucker 2020; Dawsey
and Stein 2020; Strauss 2020). Recent examples are legion.
In June, he retweeted a supporter filmed “shouting ‘white
power’ while driving a golf cart bedecked with Trump memorabilia”—later taken down but never condemned (Beggin
2020). His retweet expressed his gratitude for these “great
people” supporting him (Swasey 2020). In his July 4 rally at
Mount Rushmore, he “excoriated racial justice protesters as
‘evil’ representatives of a ‘new far-left fascism’ whose ultimate goal is ‘the end of America’” (Costa and Rucker 2020).
Echoing this animus, he has termed BLM as a “symbol of
hate,” called protesters of police violence “thugs,” and labeled
antiracism rallies “domestic terror” (Beggin 2020). In his trip
to Kenosha, Wisconsin, he refused to meet with Jacob Blake,
the African American man shot by a police officer, and
defended Kyle Rittenhouse, a white teenager who traveled
from Illinois to Kenosha, where he now stands accused of
murdering two people with an AR-15-type weapon (Schechter
2020; Wise 2020). When asked about systemic racism, Trump
said, “I don’t believe in that” (Lizza 2020).
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He soon followed up by directing Russell Vought, Office of
Management and Budget head, to cancel all federal government racial sensitivity training based on “critical race theory”
and notions of “white privilege” (Dawsey and Stein 2020).
Vought’s (2020) memorandum stated that the president
believed that these programs “undercut our core values as
Americans” and are “divisive, un-American propaganda.”
Echoing the same theme, President Trump then attacked the
educational 1619 Project, which reframes American history
through the lens of slavery and the enduring antiblack animus
it promoted. Arguing that “teaching this doctrine to our children is a form of child abuse in the truest sense of those
words,” he created the 1776 Commission to develop a patriotic, “pro-American curriculum that celebrates the truth about
our nation’s great history” (Watson and Segers 2020). Pollster
Cornell Belcher captured the moment. “Without white resentment, there is no rationale for Donald Trump. . . . Without that,
what reason do his supporters have to be with Donald Trump
if he’s not going to be your tribal strong man? He started there
and will end there” (quoted in Costa and Rucker 2020).
In this context, we explored “who wears the MAGA hat” in
multiple models using two different white samples, numerous
potential predictors, and a measure of faith in Trump, supplemented with a specific question on willingness to don a
MAGA hat. The findings reveal that faith in Trump is not fully
contingent on racial attitudes. Allegiance to the president is
also derived from his presumed base of Republicans, those living in the South, and evangelical or fundamentalist Christians.
Such support is bolstered as well by those with conservative
political ideology and antisocialist beliefs. However, contrary
to our hypothesized model, crime salience was not associated
with faith in Trump in the model, including all predictor variables. The important point, however, is that even with controls
for these political and social variables, racial beliefs of whites
matter and are likely integral to understanding the intense loyalty of the president’s white followers.
Consistent with academic research and popular commentary, racial resentment was a significant predictor in all models with faith in Trump as the dependent variable (see Tables 4
and 5). Notably, this effect is demonstrated using the standard Kinder and Sanders (1996) measure of racial resentment and using an adaptation of this scale to assess Hispanic
resentment. Future research should explore this finding on
types of racial resentment. As a side note, Chudy (2017,
forthcoming) argued that racial sympathy is activated when a
policy is specifically relevant to African Americans (e.g.,
support for affirmative action, sentencing of a black criminal
defendant). Given Trump’s racially charged rhetoric, it
seemed plausible that racial sympathy might evoke less support for the president. This was not the case. Racial sympathy
might be activated if respondents were asked about racespecific actions by the president, such as his criticism of
BLM or canceling federal racial sensitivity training, but this
remains to be demonstrated.
The importance of the contributions of Jardina (2019b,
forthcoming) and Kaufmann (2019), and the ethnographic
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work of Hochschild (2016; see also Kimmel 2013), is that
these works push social science to move beyond an overconcentration on out-group racial animus to consider ingroup racial solidarity. Racial resentment remains a robust
predictor essential to any quantitative study, but it is not the
only racial attitude that has political consequences. These
revisionist authors argue that increasing diversity, seen in
both cultural and demographic trends, is fueling the creation
of a group identity and consciousness among a sizable
minority of whites (Jardina 2019b, forthcoming). These
views cannot be reduced to white hatred and supremacy.
Jardina speaks of white identity and consciousness and
Kaufmann (2019) of ethno-traditional nationalism. We
believe that the concept of “white nationalism” is parsimonious, describes beliefs about keeping the United States
white accurately, and has intuitive appeal. Regardless of the
label settled upon, future research on the effects of racial
beliefs will benefit from including this factor in the analyses. The contemporary reality is that political allegiances
and public policy preferences are shaped not only by what
whites think about blacks but also by what whites think
about themselves.
In this regard, Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming) work is significant because it demonstrates empirically that white identity and consciousness predict warm feelings toward and a
voting preference for Donald Trump. We build on her findings in two ways. First, methodologically, we confirm that
measures of whiteness—in this case, white nationalism—are
conceptually and empirically distinct from other racial
beliefs, such as resentment and sympathy. Second, substantively, we show that white nationalism is a consistent and
robust predictor of faith in Trump for white Americans. This
association is initially demonstrated in the main analysis
with the YouGov sample. With an independent sample, we
then reproduce these results with MTurk data and proceed to
establish that white nationalism also is related to willingness
to wear a MAGA hat—again a behavioral expression of
identity fusion with the president (Kunst et al. 2019). A sea
of whites donning MAGA hats at campaign rallies thus
seems due not only to the Trump camp’s marketing prowess
but also to his follows’ desire to display faith in their man.
Taken together with Jardina’s (2019b, forthcoming)
research, the present study appears to confirm what these
observations of Trump campaign rallies suggest: race is integral to his popularity and electoral success among whites.
Trump’s genius was in understanding that many white
Americans felt like strangers in their own land, to use
Hochschild’s (2016) poignant phrase. “Radical Islamists”
and “bad hombres” as well as proposed bans and walls, were
convenient conduits to communicate that he was on their
side in the culture wars devaluing them and their social
standing. The use of the MAGA acronym communicated that
he was going to make their America great again by slowing
demographic change and by defending the symbols of whiteness. Trump’s “racialized political narratives,” noted Fording
and Schram (2020), “helped make his campaign slogan to
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‘Make America Great Again’ easily be decoded to mean we
need to ‘Make American White Again’” (p. 40). He promised
to be their champion, and they responded with faith in Trump.
He reaffirmed their status and served their emotional interests (Hochschild 2016).
Two issues remain to be determined. First, Trump’s 2020
campaign focused less on “dangerous” out-groups—
Muslims and Mexicans—and more on animus toward
African American (BLM) protesters. In the aftermath of the
George Floyd incident and rising concern over racial justice
(Eligon 2020), it is unclear if this political strategy will
increase or erode faith in Trump. The recent presidential
election, however, likely did little to suggest a decline in
Trump’s popularity or to provide any incentive from him to
change his political strategy. Although losing to Biden,
Trump amassed more than 74.2 million votes—the second
highest total historically (to Biden’s 81.3 million votes),
including 95 percent of all Republicans and 58 percent of all
white voters. These figures are similar to or higher than in
the 2016 election; Trump even increased his support in 2020
among people of color. Young Americans constitute one
crack in this wall of support. Exit polls report that nearly
two thirds of those ages 18 to 24 (65 percent) cast their vote
for Biden (CNN 2016, 2020). This generational gap in
Trump support may dim the prospect of Trumpism, if not
now, perhaps in the future.
Second, in the post-Trump era, it is unclear whether white
in-group solidarity will grow and intensify or attenuate as
cultural and demographic diversity become an unstoppable
development (Jones 2016). It also remains to be seen if politicians within the Republican Party will continue to attempt
to capitalize on racial resentment and white nationalism.
Donald Trump shows no signs of receding into the dustbin of
defeated presidential candidates, holding out the promise of
a presidential run in 2024 and threatening to punish any politician who does not show sufficient loyalty to him, including
in his doomed attempt to retain his office. Trump endures as
the elephant in the Republican room. “Republicans should
wake up,” observed Rubin (2020). “A sizable segment of
‘their’ base is not theirs at all. Those voters are the ones in
red hats hollering that the election was stolen” (see also
Thompson 2020). Indeed, commentators are holding a
requiem for the establishment GOP, noting that the party of
Lincoln is now owned by Trump (The Editorial Board 2020).
According to the New York Times, the party “allowed itself to
be co-opted by Trumpism. Its ideology has been reduced to a
slurry of paranoia, white grievance and authoritarian populism” (The Editorial Board 2020). Republican presidential
hopefuls are not running away from these sentiments but are
embracing Trumpism and its emphasis on white workingclass resentment toward liberal “socialism,” efforts to
“defund the police,” and talk of “systemic racism” (see
Waldman 2020). Still, central questions remain: Will whites
with this inclination wear MAGA hats for other candidates,
or is their faith in the president a historical quirk unique to
Donald Trump? And what role will be played by racial
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beliefs, including white nationalism, in shaping such political allegiances?
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